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A NEW APPROACH TO HOME RULE IN ILLINOIS-
COUNTY OF COOK V. JOHN SEXTON CONTRACTORS CO.
Prior to the adoption of Article VII of the 1970 Illinois Constitution (Arti-
cle VII), the General Assembly governed the affairs of local government pur-
suant to a rule of legislative supremacy often referred to as Dillon's Rule.'
This rule authorizes a municipality to exercise only those powers expressly
or implicitly granted or those indispensible to its declared objectives. 2
Under this common law doctrine, a municipality is dependent upon the
legislature for the granting of any new powers.3
The drafters of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, however, favored a grant of
authority to municipalities to exercise governmental power without prior au-
thorization by the state legislature. 4  In constitutional and statutory law this
right of local self-government is referred to as home rule. 5 Home rule was
1. SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 7 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 1603-04
(1972) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS]; Batm, A Tentative Survey of Illinois Home Rule
(Part I): Powers and Limitations, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 137 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Baum]. This
rule is aptly titled Dillon's Rule because it was first enunciated in definitive form by Judge John
F. Dillon of the Iowa Supreme Court. Id. at 137. See also I J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TIONS 448-50 (5th ed. 1911) [hereinafter cited as DILLON].
2. Dillon's Rule states:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation pos-
sesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those granted in
express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied or incident to the powers
expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared ob-
jects and purposes of the corporation, -not simply convenient but indispensible.
DILLON, supra note 1, at 448-50 (emphasis in original). For applications of this rule, see Strub
v. Village of Deerfield, 19 I11. 2d 401, 167 N.E.2d 178 (1960) (although given no express author-
ity to do so, a municipality can limit the number of scavenger licenses issued under its ordi-
nance regulating the collection of garbage); Concrete Contractors' Ass'n v. Village of LaGrange
Park, 14 II1. 2d 65, 150 N.E.2d 577 (1958) (the power of a municipality to license a cement
contractor is implied in its express power to establish and maintain its streets and sidewalks);
Consumers Co. v. City of Chicago, 313 Ill. 408, 145 N.E. 114 (1924) (the express power to
dispose of garbage includes the power to create and use the necessary means to accomplish
this). See Ives v. City of Chicago, 30 Ill. 2d 582, 198 N.E.2d 518 (1964) (an ordinance of the
city to license and regulate building contractors was not derived from an express grant of au-
thority or one necessary and incidental to such powers and thus was declared invalid and void).
3. Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role fir the Courts, 48
MINN. L. REV. 643, 653-54 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Sandalow]. See also PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 1, at 1603; Biebel, Home Rule in Illinois After Two Years: Au Uncertain Begin-
ning, 6 J. MAR. J. OF PRAC. AND PROC. 253, 254 (1973).
4. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 1605. A broad grant of municipal powers through the
mechanism of home rule has been favored almost without exception by modem students of
municipal affairs. Sandalow, supra note 3, at 652.
5. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 866 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). As a legal doctrine, home rule is "a
particular method for distributing power between state and local governments." Sandalow,
supra note 3, at 645.
Over the years, "the concept of home rule [has been] beset with a multitude of meanings and
implications, with little or no unanimity of agreement in respect to its basic component factors
but with a predominant . . . central idea that its objective is to secure greater powers of local
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
adopted in Illinois to broaden the powers of local governments and to enable
them to contribute effectively to solving the many problems created by the
increasing urbanization of our society. 6
Article VII, therefore, represents a departure from Dillon's Rule of legisla-
tive supremacy. 7 It provides that a home rule unit, unless specifically lim-
ited by the General Assembly, is entitled to "exercise any power and per-
form any function pertaining to its government and affairs." 8  Indeed, the
language of this article was intended to confer upon home rule units the
broadest possible range of powers to deal with local problems. 9
Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the scope of a home rule
unit's power to require compliance with its zoning ordinance in an area also
subject to regulation by the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
(IEPA). 10 In County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors Co. ," the court
government to municipalities." CHICAGO HOME RULE COMM'N, CHICAGo'S GOVERNMENT: ITS
STRUCTURAL MODERNIZATION AND HOME RULE PROBLEMS 195 (1954). Even as early as 1919,
a draft of a municipal home rule provision was presented by the Legislative Reference Bureau
to the framers of the 1920 constitutional convention. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, 6
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION BULLETINS 426-28 (1920).
Home rule provisions are varied among the more than 40 states that have adopted such a
system. Froehlich, Home Rule and Intergovernmental Cooperation and Conflict, in 2 ILLINOIS
MUNICIPAL LAw § 22.2 (S. Diamond ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Froehlich]. All provisions,
however, do vest greater authority in the local government officials and citizens "to determine
the powers, functions, structure, and organization of local government units with corresponding
greater freedom from legislative provision and control." PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 1604.
In Illinois, any county or other municipality which has a population exceeding 25,000 is au-
tomatically a home rule unit unless it elects not to be one. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a).
Municipalities with a population of less than 25,000 may elect by referendum to become home
rule units. Id. The latest available data reveals 91 home rule municipalities and one home rule
county (Cook County) in Illinois. Of the 91 municipalities that are home rule units, 23 achieved
this status by referenda. Based on population growth projections, an additional 23 municipalities
will become home rule units by 1980. Froehlich, supra at §§ 27.17-18, § 22.26.
6. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 1605. Although the need for increased powers of local
government to meet the problems of urbanization was the primary motive to establish home
rule, the Local Government Committee of the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention also
favored a strengthening of local government for other reasons:
[Local government] is closer to the people it serves than are other forms of gov-
ernment and, as a result, on balance is likely to be more responsible to the
citizenry, more sensitive to community needs and more efficient and effective in
meeting these needs. In addition, balancing the powers of local governments will
reduce the number of bills dealing with local matters that now overburden the
General Assembly, will strengthen the role of local officials in determining local
issues and diminish the power of state legislators who are less familiar with local
conditions, and reduce the amount of state control over local affairs.
Id. at 1605-06.
7. Baum, supra note 1, at 138.
8. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a).
9. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 1605.
10. The Illinois Environmental Protection Agency was established pursuant to the Environ-
mental Protection Act, effective July 1, 1970. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 , § 1004 (1977). It is
the purpose of the Act, which is administered by the IEPA, "to establish a unified, statewide
[Vol. 29:603
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held that, although the IEPA had issued a permit for the operation of a
privately-owned sanitary landfill, Cook County, as a home rule unit, could
require that the landfill owners also conform to the county zoning ordinance.
Prior to this decision, the Illinois Supreme Court had not reviewed this
issue in this precise manner. 12
This Note attempts to resolve the apparent inconsistency between the re-
suilt reached in Sexton and the results of earlier Illinois Supreme Court deci-
sions on environmental regulation. 13 In addition, the Note considers the
range of powers intended to be granted by the Article VII language, "per-
taining to its government and affairs", in light of this recent decision. 14 Fi-
nally, the Note determines the extent to which State law has preempted a
county's home rule powers in this area and the extent to which such powers
may be exercised concurrently. 15
THE SEXTON FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
John Sexton Contractors Co. had developed and was attempting to operate
a sanitary landfill on an eighty-five acre tract of land in an unincorporated
portion of Cook County. 16 Although the IEPA had issued developmental
and operational permits to Sexton, 17 the landfill site was zoned as an R-4
program supplemented by private remedies, to restore, protect and enhance the quality of the
environment, and to assure that adverse effects upon the environment are fully considered and
borne by those who cause them." Id. §§ 1001-1004.
11. 75 Ill. 2d 494, 389 N.E.2d 553 (1979).
12. Although the regulation of sanitary landfills by non home rule units had been addressed
in Carlson v. Village of Worth, 62 I11. 2d 406, 343 N.E.2d 493 (1975), and O'Connor v. City of
Rockford, 52 I11. 2d 360, 288 N.E.2d 432 (1972), Sexton is the first Illinois Supreme Court
decision since City of Chicago v. Pollution Control Bd., 59 I11. 2d 484, 322 N.E.2d 11 (1974), to
address a home rule unit's power to so regulate. See notes 47-50 and accompanying text infra.
In City of Chicago the issue involved the home rule unit's refusal to comply with the provisions
of the Act; the case did not address the power of a home rule unit to require compliance with
its zoning ordinance subsequent to issuance of a permit by the operators of the landfill.
13. See notes 32-50 and accompanying text infra.
14. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a).
15. The doctrine of preemption originally was applied only in federal cases where the court
found that a particular matter was of such a national character that federal law should take
precedence over state law. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), Glen Ellyn Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Tsoumas, 71 Ill. 2d 493, 377
N.E.2d 1 (1978). State legislatures may preempt local governments in a similar manner. S.
GIFIs, LAw DICTIONARY 158 (1975). See, e.g., Ampersand, Inc., v. Finley, 61 111. 2d 537, 338
N.E.2d 15 (1975); Kanellos v. County of Cook, 53 Ill. 2d 161, 290 N.E.2d 240 (1972); O'Conner v.
City of Rockfbrd, 52 IIl. 2d 360, 388 N.E.2d 432 (1972). See also Niro, Illinois Environmental
Law-State Preemption of Local Governmental Regulation of Pollution Related Activities, 67
ILL. B.J. 118 (1978).
16. 75 III. 2d at 502-03, 389 N.E.2d at 554.
17. Id. Pursuant to the Act, the IEPA is authorized to issue permits and the Illinois Pollu-
tion Control Board is empowered to promulgate regulations requiring permits for a wide variety
of activities. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 § 1039-40 (1977). Both construction and operating
permits for sanitary landfill facilities are specifically provided for in the Act. Id. § 1021(e).
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single-family residential district pursuant to Cook County's zoning ordi-
nance. 18 Because this particular classification does not permit the operation
of a sanitary landfill, Cook County brought suit for injunctive relief to en-
force its home rule zoning ordinance against Sexton. 19 In the meantime,
responding to a complaint filed by the Village of Richton Park (Village), the
Illinois Pollution Control Board (Board) held hearings to review Sexton's
actions. 20 As a result, Sexton then added the Board and the Village as
additional counter-defendants. 2
1
The Circuit Court of Cook County determined that it, rather than the
Board, had jurisdiction over the matter, and it enjoined further Board pro-
ceedings . 2 2 The court then ruled that the Environmental Protection Act
preempted any authority of home rule units to regulate the location of sani-
tary landfills, 23 and it enjoined the County from interfering with Sexton's
sanitary landfill operation. 24 The County, the Board, and the Village sepa-
rately appealed. Pursuant to an Illinois Supreme Court Rule, the case was
transferred directly to the Illinois Supreme Court. 25
18. The Cook County Zoning Ordinance pertinent to a single family residential district is
the R-4 classification which provides that "[a]ll uses not expressly authorized ... are expressly
prohibited." COOK COUNTY ZONING ORDINANCE, COOK COUNTY, ILL. § 4.57 (1976).
19. Specifically listed as an example of a prohibited use tinder this category is use as a
landfill or dump. Id.
20. 75 Ill. 2d at 503, 389 N.E.2d at 554.
21. Sexton was granted leave to amend its counterclaim and named the Village and Board as
counter-defendants. 75 III. 2d at 504, 389 N.E.2d at 554.
22. The circuit court entered and issued an order declaring Board Procedural Rule 503(a)
and Solid Waste Rule 205(j) invalid on the grounds that the Board, in adopting these rules,
exceeded the authority granted to it by the Act. Id. at 504, 389 N.E.2d at 555. Illinois Pollution
Control Board Procedural Rule 503(a) provides:
Any person may file a Complaint seeking revocation of a permit on the ground that
it was issued by the Agency in violation of the Act, or the Regulations, or of a
Board Order, or seeking a cease-and-desist order against the activity described in
the permit on the ground that it would cause a violation of the Act, or the Regula-
tions, or of a Board Order ....
ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD, RULES AND REGULATIONS, ch. 1: Procedure, Rule
503(a).
Illinois Pollution Control Board Solid Waste Rule 2050) provides that "(a)ny person adversely
affected by the issuance of a permit may petition the Board for a hearing, before the Board to
contest the issuance by the Agency.' Id. ch. 7: Solid Waste, Rule 2050).
23. 75 III. 2d at 504, 389 N.E.2d at 555.
24. Id.
25. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 302(b) provides:
After the filing of the notice of appeal to the Appellate Court in a case in which the
public interest requires prompt adjudication by the Supreme Court, the Supreme
Court or a justice thereof may order that the appeal to be taken directly to it [sic].
Upon the entry of such an order, any documents already filed in the Appellate
Court shall be transmitted by the clerk of that court to the clerk of the Supreme
Court. From that point the case shall proceed in all respects as though the appeal
had been taken directly to the Supreme Court.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. ll0a, § 302(b) (1977).
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THE SEXTON DECISIONS
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision that the Act
preempted the authority of home rule units to regulate the location of sani-
tary landfills. 26 In deciding this issue, the court first distinguished prior
decisions involving non home rule units and concluded that a statutory ap-
proach must be used when a home rule unit is involved. 27 Next, the court
reviewed the statutory authority of home rule units and concluded that regu-
lation of sanitary landfills is a proper exercise of this power. 28 In reaching
this conclusion, the court distinguished from the Sexton situation precedent
involving home rule units that attempted regulation beyond the home rule
unit boundaries. 29 The court analyzed the methods by which the home rule
power may be preempted and then decided that the Act had failed to
preempt the home rule unit's power. 30 Thus, Sexton established that a
sanitary landfill must comply with both the standards prescribed for issuance
of an IEPA permit and the applicable Cook County zoning ordinance. 31
Prior Decisions Involving Municipal Regulation
Prior Illinois Supreme Court decisions involving the regulation of en-
vironmental control facilities by municipalities involved two types of gov-
ernmental units-non home rule and home rule units. These earlier deci-
sions provide a split of authority. One line of cases involves regulation of
sanitary landfills by non home rule units and questions the extent of their
authority to legislate concurrently with the IEPA.3 2
In O'Connor v. City of Rockford,3 3 the court held that a city's use of a
site as a sanitary landfill should not be dependent upon issuance of a condi-
tional use permit by the County. To do so "contravene(s) the clearly ex-
pressed legislative intent that such operations be conducted only upon issuance
of a permit from the Environmental Protection Agency." 34  This case was
26. 75 Ill. 2d at 517, 389 N.E.2d at 561. The Illinois Supreme Court also affirmed the
circuit court's enjoining further proceedings before the Board. Id. at 504-05, 517, 389 N.E.2d at
555, 561.
27. Id. at 505-07, 389 N.E.2d at 555-56.
28. Id. 'at 507-12, 389 N.E.2d at 556-59.
29. Id. at 509-10, 512, 389 N.E.2d at 557, 558-59. For a sampling of these cases, see notes
40-46 and accompanying text infra.
30. Id. at 513-14, 389 N.E.2d at 559. See notes 60-65 and accompanying text infra for a
discussion of the methods by which the home rule power may be preempted.
31. 75 I11. 2d at 516-17, 389 N.E.2d at 560-61.
32. Carlson v. Village of Worth, 62 I11. 2d 406, 343 N.E.2d 493 (1975); O'Connor v. City of
Rockford, 52 I11. 2d 360, 288 N.E.2d 432 (1972).
33. 52 II. 2d 360, 288 N. E.2d 432 (1972). In O'Connor, the City of Rockford maintained that it was
entitled to operate a sanitary landfill on a tract of land outside the city limits without complying with
Winnebago County's zoning ordinances. The court held that the County could not prohibit such use,
since the clearly-expressed legislative intent is that operation of a sanitary landfill be conducted only
upon issuance of a permit from the IEPA. Id. at 361, 367, 288 N.E.2d at 432, 436.
34. Id. at 367, 288 N.E.2d at 436.
1980]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [
followed by the 1975 decision of Carlson v. Village of Worth. 35 Subsequent
to the issuance of an IEPA permit to the plaintiff to install and operate a
sanitary landfill, the Village passed an ordinance also requiring compliance
with its permit procedures.36 The court concluded that local registration
was preempted by State legislation in this matter. 37
These cases are not indicative of the majority view in Sexton that, at least
in the case of a home rule unit, a sanitary landfill must comply with both
municipal and state regulation.38 The Sexton court viewed these previous
decisions as distinguishable precedent since both municipalities involved
were non home rule units. 39
The other line of authority deals with cases involving home rule units. In
Metropolitan Sanitary District v. City of Des Plaines, 40 the supreme court
rejected the contention that regulation of a sewage treatment plant by the
City of Des Plaines was within its home rule power. This case did involve a
home rule unit, but the City of Des Plaines represented only a part of the
geographic region to be served by the facility. 41 The sewage treatment
plant served six other municipalities, some of which were themselves home
rule units. 42 Sexton was distinguished from this case because it did not
involve "a regional governmental district seeking to create a facility to serve
a specific region, with a part of that region attempting to regulate the facil-
ity." 43
In a later decision, City of Des Plaines v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway
Co., 44 the court ruled that noise pollution is a matter requiring regional if
35. 62 I11. 2d 406, 343 N.E.2d 493 (1975).
36. Id. at 407-08, 343 N.E.2d at 494.
37. Id. at 408, 343 N.E.2d at 495. See note 15 supra for a discussion of preemption.
38. 75 Ill. 2d at 516-17, 389 N.E.2d at 561.
39. Id. at 505-07, 389 N.E.2d at 555-56. Justice Ryan, who rendered a vigorous dissent in
Carlson, concurred in Sexton, stating that Carlson is a case of "questionable precedential
value." Id. at 520, 389 N.E.2d at 562.
40. 63 Ill. 2d 256, 347 N.E.2d 716 (1976). The City of Des Plaines, with a 1970 population
exceeding 50,000, automatically qualified as a home rule unit. Froehlich, supra note 5, at
§ 22.17.
41. 63 II1. 2d at 260-61, 347 N.E.2d at 718-19.
42. Id.
43. 75 Ill. 2d at 510, 389 N.E.2d at 557. Chief Justice Goldenhersh, in his dissent, relied on
Metropolitan Sanitary District to dispute the majority's conclusion that "control of landfills is a
function pertaining to the government and affairs of a local unit of government." Id. at 522, 389
N.E,2d at 563 (Goldenhersh, C.J., dissenting). He failed to address, however, the precise issue
on which the majority distinguished this case-Sexton did not involve a home rule unit at-
tempting to regulate a facility that was designed to serve an area embracing other home rule
units. Id. at 510, 389 N.E.2d at 557. Justice Underwood, who delivered the majority decision in
Metropolitan Sanitary District, rendered a concurring opinion in Sexton, albeit with some re-
servation as to the distinguishability of Metropolitan Sanitary District and Sexton. Id. at 517-19,
389 N.E.2d at 561-62 (Underwood, J., concurring).
44. 65 Ill. 2d 1, 357 N.E.2d 433 (1976).
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not statewide standards, and that therefore the city may not enforce its noise
control ordinance. Because the ordinance was intended to control noise
emissions originating beyond the city's boundaries, the home rule power was
exceeded. 45  Because the zoning ordinance at issue in Sexton only restricted
the use of land within the home rule unit's boundaries, the supreme court
rejected this precedent.4 6
The Sexton court did rely extensively, however, on City of Chicago v.
Pollution Control Board, 47 a 1974 Illinois Supreme Court decision involving
a factual situation very similar to that in Sexton-the regulation of sanitary
landfills by a home rule unit. City of Chicago concluded that "a local gov-
ernmental unit may legislate concurrently with the General Assembly on
environmental control."- 48  Prior to Sexton, this conclusion had been re-
duced to the status of dictum by Carlson.49 The majority in Sexton, how-
ever, clearly adopted this reasoning, at least insofar as home rule units are
concerned. 50
Statutory Authority of Home Rule Units
A review of the statutory authority on this subject reveals that regulation
of sanitary landfills by Cook County comes within the ambit of its home rule
powers only if such regulation "pertain(s) to its government and affairs." 5 1
45. Id.
46. 75 111. 2d at 512, 389 N.E.2d at 558-59. The decision in Northwestern Ry. did not
indicate that the ordinance in issue attempted to regulate the sites of noise pollution. The issue
in that case concerned the regulation of the noise itself, which extended beyond the home rule
boundaries. In contrast, the zoning ordinance in Sexton is not aimed at regulating any aspect of
a landfill except for the site itself. Reply Brief and Argument for Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-
Appellant, County of Cook at 4, County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors Co., 75 II1. 2d 494,
389 N.E.2d 553 (1979).
47. 59 111. 2d 484, 322 N.E.2d 11 (1974).
48. Id. at 489, 322 N.E.2d at 14-15.
49. The Carlson court considered this statement as dictum because "[n]o issue relating to
the power of a municipality to legislate concerning environmental control was before the court,
and certainly it was not intended to overrule the decision of this court in the O'Connor case."
62 I11. 2d at 409, 343 N.E.2d at 495. As previously noted, however, both Carlson and O'Connor
involved non home rule units and as such are limited by Sexton in their applicability. See note
39 and accompanying text supra.
50. 75 Ill. 2d at 507, 389 N.E.2d at 556. See also Carlson v. Briceland, 61 111. App. 3d 247,
251, 377 N.E.2d 1138, 1142 (1st Dist. 1978), in which the Illinois Appellate Court adhered to
the Supreme Court holding in City of Chicago, noting that "there is no clear-cut precedent
eliminating Cook County's home rule authority over the location of refuse disposal operations."
51. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a). The "pertaining to" language of section 6(a) originally was
designed to restrict home rule powers to matters local in nature. Baum, supra note 1, at 153.
The Local Government Committee, in its proposal to, the Illinois Constitutional Convention,
stated that "the powers of home rule units relate to their own problems, not to those of the
state or nation .... Thus, the proposed grant of powers to local governments extends only to
matters 'pertaining to their government and affairs'." PROCEEDINGS supra note 1, at 1621. The
inclusion of these words in the home rule grant was not a matter of controversy, and the
language suggested by the majority was accepted without dispute. Id. at 1853-1942.
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There is no question that this language limits the home rule power; at issue
is the extent of this limitation.5 2
The drafters of the 1970 Illinois Constitution intended to ensure that
home rule units "receive directly under the Constitution the broadest possi-
ble range of powers to deal with problems facing them and with demands
that are made upon them." 53  This intent is reiterated in section 6(m) of
Article VII, which states that "powers and functions of home rule units shall
be construed liberally. " 54
The Sexton majority rejected the appellee's contention that a home rule
unit may not regulate sanitary landfills. 55 Relying not only on the legisla-
tive history of the Constitution, 56 but also on the court's earlier decisions
involving regulation of garbage disposal, 57 the court concluded that "the
County's zoning restrictions regarding sanitary landfills pertain(s) to its gov-
ernment and affairs." 5 8
Legislative Preemption
Having established that the regulation of sanitary landfills is within the
County's home rule powers, Sexton next addressed the question of legisla-
tive preemption or limitation on the home rule power. 59 To preempt the
home rule unit's power, the legislature must satisfy several conditions. Ini-
tially, it must act pursuant to the requirements of Article VII, section 6(g),6 0
52. Baum, supra note 1, at 153.
53. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 1619.
54. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(m). Froehlich proposes that this section is a reversal of Dil-
Ion's Rule for home rule units. Froehlich, supra note 5, § 22.15.
55. 75 II1. 2d at 511-12, 389 N.E.2d at 558-59.
Two 1978 Illinois Appellate Court decisions interpreted the meaning of home rule and mat-
ters of local concern in a manner similar to that in Sexton. See Landry v. Smith, 63 II1. App. 3d
616, 384 N.E.2d 430 (1st Dist. 1978); Carlson v. Briceland, 61 111. App. 3d 247, 377 N.E.2d
1138 (1st Dist. 1978). Concluding that regulation of a sanitary landfill is within the home rule
powers, the court in Briceland stated, "it is difficult to conceive of a concern more local than
where garbage should be disposed of." Id. at 254, 377 N.E.2d at 1143-44. The court in Landry
also adhered to a broad interpretation of home rule powers and held that a city's regulation of a
landlord's eviction procedures is a matter of local concern and thereby pertains to its govern-
ment and affairs. 63 I11. App. 3d at 620-21, 384 N.E.2d at 433.
56. See text accompanying notes 51-54 supra.
57. These pre-home rule decisions held that a municipality, through its police power, can
regulate the collection, removal, and disposal of garbage, and they are relevant since a sanitary
landfill is one means of garbage disposal. Montgomery v. City of Galva, 41 I11. 2d 562, 244
N.E.2d 193 (1969); Strub v. Village of Deerfield, 19 I11. 2d 401, 167 N.E.2d 178 (1960); Con-
sumers Co. v. City of Chicago, 313 I11. 408, 145 N.E. 114 (1924). The court also relied upon an earlier
decision that held that regulation of noise from a factory was of local concern and subject to the
city's zoning ordinance. Dube v. City of Chicago, 7 II1. 2d 313, 131 N.E.2d 9 (1955).
58. 75 III. 2d at 511-12, 389 N.E.2d at 558.
59. Id. at 513, 389 N.E.2d at 559.
60. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(g), provides that "[t]he General Assembly by a law approved by the
vote of three-fifths of the members elected to each house may deny or limit . . . any . . . power or
function of a home rule unit."
[Vol. 29:603
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which requires approval by a three-fifths majority of each house of the Gen-
eral Assembly, or section 6(h), 6 1 which requires a simple majority of each
house if exclusive exercise by the state is specifically provided in the legisla-
tion. Further, the legislature must act subsequent to July 1, 1971, the effec-
tive date of the Illinois Constitution. 62
According to Sexton, the Act had failed to meet any of the conditions
requisite to preemption of the home rule powers used by Cook County in
regulating the establishment of sanitary landfills. First, the court failed to
find any evidence that would support a contention that the legislature at-
tempted to deny or limit the County's home rule power pursuant to section
6(g).63 Second, the court relied on City of Chicago to hold that no express
indication of an intent to limit or deny the home rule powers as required for
preemption pursuant to section 6(h) was contained in the Act. 64  Finally,
the court noted that the Act, which became effective on July 1, 1970, was
enacted prior to the July 1, 1971, effective date of the Illinois Constitution,
and accordingly could not preempt the home rule unit's legislation in this
manner. 
65
After holding that the Act failed to preempt the home rule powers, the
Sexton majority next determined the proper relationship between the pow-
ers of the IEPA and those of Cook County as the home rule unit by relying
on the decision in City of Chicago and also on the statutory authority con-
tained in Article VII, section 6(i). Using different guidelines than those used
by Chief Justice Goldenhersh in his dissent, the majority concluded that the
state and county could act in unison on matters of environmental con-
cern. 66 In City of Chicago, the court stated that home rule units may legis-
61. Id. § 6(h) provides that "[t]he General Assembly may provide specifically by law for the
exclusive exercise by the State of any power or function of a home rule unit." Only a simple
majority is required under § 6(h). Id.
If the state legislates but does not express exclusivity, local governmental units retain the
power to act concurrently. City of Chicago v. Pollution Control Bd., 59 Ill. 2d at 489, 322
N.E.2d at 14-15. See also Kanellos v. County of Cook, 53 Il1. 2d 161, 166, 290 N.E.2d 240, 243
(1972) (legislative limitation must be expressly delineated).
62. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. City of Chicago, 66 I11. 2d 437, 362 N.E.2d 1021
(1977) (a conflicting statute enacted prior to the effective date of the Illinois Constitution is
superseded by the home rule power); Paglini v. Police Bd. of City of Chicago, 61 111. 2d 233,
335 N.E.2d 480 (1975) (an ordinance of a home rule unit can supersede a previously enacted
conflicting statute); Kanellos v. County of Cook, 53 III. 2d at 166, 290 N.E.2d at 243 (pre-1970
statute held inapplicable insofar as applied to a home rule county); Union Nat'l Bank and Trust
Co. v. Board of Supervisors of Kendall County, 65 I11. App. 3d 1004, 382 N.E.2d 1382 (2nd
Dist. 1978) (to the extent that two statutes are inconsistent, the earlier act is, to that extent,
repealed). See also ILL. CONST. TRANSITION SCHEDULE § 9.
63. 75 I11. 2d at 513, 389 N.E.2d at 559. See note 60 supra.
64. Id. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 , §§ 1001-1050 (1977).
65. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 , § 1001 (1977). See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
66. 75 111. 2d at 516-17, 389 N.E.2d at 559-60.
The need for a statewide program discussed by Chief Justice Goldenhersh in his dissent in
Sexton is not incongruous with concurrent legislation by the home rule unit. 75 I11. 2d at 520-
21, 389 N.E.2d at 562-63 (Goldenhersh, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice bases his argument
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late concurrently with the General Assembly on such matters. 67 This hold-
ing is consistent with the language of section 6(i) that "[h]ome rule units
may exercise and perform concurrently with the State any power or function
of a home rule unit to the extent that the General Assembly by law does not
specifically limit the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the State's
exercise to be exclusive." 6 8
THE LAW AFTER SEXTON
The significance of the Sexton decision is limited to regulation by and
within the home rule unit. 69 Although the court has succeeded in clarifying
the position of prior Illinois decisions concerning regulation of environmental
control facilities, 70 a practical problem arises with implementation of this
ruling. Clearly, in situations identical to Sexton, conformity to both state and
home rule regulation will be required. 71
Home rule units attempting to regulate beyond their geographic bound-
aries, however, are still forced to address the issue of the Metropolitan
Sanitary District decision. 72 This case was narrowly distinguished by the
Sexton majority because it involved regulation of a regional facility by a
home rule unit representing only part of the region to be served by that
facility.73 Although the court did not consider the Sexton landfill a regional
facility, it admitted that the facility would be used by surrounding com-
munities. 74 Unfortunately, the Sexton majority refrained from defining
on the distinction drawn between the powers of the Board in relation to particular types of
pollution problems. Id. The power to prescribe standards for the location of land pollution and
refuse disposal has been specifically provided for, whereas the regulations relating to the control
of air and water pollution do not specifically require the Board to promulgate standards for the
location of those facilities. Id. Chief Justice Goldenhersh interprets this distinction as indicative
of the legislature's intent that location of a sanitary landfill should be determined according to a
unified statewide program. Id.
Instead, it is suggested that the distinction is drawn because of the differences in the nature
of the types of pollution. Regulation of land pollution and refuse disposal is of necessity more
concerned with the location of these facilities because the land itself is used in the control of
pollution and suitability of a particular site is of primary importance. The regulations concerning
air and water pollution do not address location but instead concentrate on specifying the types
of equipment to be used, for in this type of pollution equipment is of fundamental importance
in implementing control. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 , § 1017 (1977). The majority required home
rule units to adhere to uniform statewide standards but at the same time permitted local im-
plementation and enforcement of these uniform standards. 75 I11. 2d at 515, 389 N.E.2d at 560.
67. 59 III. 2(d at 489, 322 N.E.2d at 14-15.
68. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(i).
69. 75 III. 2d at 513, 516, 389 N.E.2d at 559-60.
70. See notes 32-50 and accompanying text supra.
71. See note 78 infra for a discussion of the IEPA's current approach to the problem.
72. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. v. City of Des Plaines, 63 Ill. 2(1 256, 347 N.E.2d 716
(1976).
73. See notes 40-43 and accompanying text supra.
74. 75 Ill. 2d at 510, 389 N.E.2d at 557.
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exactly what is meant by the term "regional". 75 Therefore, in situations not
closely analogous to Sexton, home rule units attempting regulation that may
affect other municipalities must look for other grounds to distinguish Met-
ropolitan Sanitary District until the meaning of "regional" facility is
clarified. Implementation of Sexton in such situations would have been facili-
tated if the majority instead had chosen to overrule the earlier decision.
Although the status of state legislation that conflicts with home rule legis-
lation is an area that remains unresolved by the Sexton decision, recent cases
have held that a home rule ordinance will prevail over an inconsistent state
statute that was enacted prior to the effective date of the 1970 Illinois Con-
stitution. 76 To date, however, the problem of state legislation that was
enacted subsequent to the 1970 Illinois Constitution and that conflicts with
home rule legislation has not been addressed. Unless the requirements for
preemption of the home rule unit's power are satisfied, 77 a subsequently-
enacted conflicting state statute apparently will be forced to yield to the
home rule unit's power.
The Sexton decision most acutely will affect home rule units in their rela-
tionship with state legislative bodies and administrative agencies. The IEPA
already has undertaken efforts to preempt home rule powers in siting sani-
tary landfills. 78 It is anticipated that several bills will be introduced in the
next session of the Illinois General Assembly as a direct response to the
problems encountered by the IEPA in Sexton. 79  Passage of legislation to
empower the IEPA to preempt the home rule power should be forestalled,
however, until the effects of Sexton are evaluated, and it is then determined
that concurrent regulation is an impractical solution.
75. Id.
76. Stryker v. Village of Oak Park, 62 111. 2d 523, 343 N.E.2d 919 (1976); Paglini v. Police
Bd., 61 111. 2d 233, 335 N.E.2d 480 (1975); Kanellos v. County of Cook, 53 Ill. 2d 161, 290
N.E.2d 240 (1972).
77. See notes 59-65 and accompanying text supra.
78. 15 LOCAL GoV'T NEWSLETTER (111. St. B.A.) No. 2 (June 1979). The Illinois Environ-
mental Protection Agency considers this to be a decision of major impact. In anticipation of the
problems to be encountered, on January 31, 1979, House Representative D. Deuster intro-
duced a bill to the General Assembly to curtail the powers of the home rule unit in siting
landfills. H.R. 114, Ill. Gen. Assembly, 81st Sess. (1979). "The siting procedures and rules
provided for in this Act for regional pollution control facilities shall be the exclusive siting
procedures and rules for such facilities." Id. The bill passed in the House of Representatives but
after being sent to the Senate, was referred to the Agriculture, Conservation and Energy Com-
mittee for further study. To date, no further action has been taken on this bill. 1 STATE OF
ILLINOIS, LEGISLATIVE SYNOPSIS AND DIGEST (JUNE, 1979).
Currently, the IEPA has to deal with the practical problem of determining how to site land-
fills. In situations involving sites in home rule units, the IEPA is advising that complying with
the local zoning ordinance in addition to obtaining an IEPA permit is necessary. Where non
home rule units are involved, however, the IEPA considers its own permit to be the only
necessity. Interview with Delbert Haschemeyer, Deputy Director of the Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency, Springfield, Illinois (Sept. 20, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Haschemever In-
terview].
79. Haschemever Interview, supra note 78.
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Concurrent regulation is desirable to preserve the interests of the local
community under the present system of environmental regulation. Pres-
ently, before permits are issued, the home rule unit is required to hold
public hearings in the localities of proposed land use changes so that local
zoning and planning boards can afford members of the local citizenry an
opportunity to present their viewpoints on the proposed changes. 80 Because
the IEPA is not required to hold public hearings in the local areas where
land use for sanitary landfills is proposed, 81 the interests of the people most
directly affected by the changes might not be best served if exclusive author-
ity is granted to the IEPA.
Although its greatest effect will be in situations that are closely analogous
to Sexton, the decision also has applicability outside the area of environmen-
tal regulation, an extension of the Sexton theory to situations involving a
home rule unit's licensing or regulatory power can certainly be foreseen.8 2
Because the grant of these powers in Article VII, section 6(a) specifies that
these powers pertain to the home rule unit's government and affairs. Thus,
in such situations, only the question of legislative preemption with regard to
these powers remains to be addressed.
Nevertheless, Sexton must be narrowly construed. 83 Clearly it does not
apply to non home rule situations. 84 As discussed above, attempts by home
rule units to regulate beyond their boundaries will be met with uncertain
results until the status of Metropolitan Sanitary District is clarified. 8 5
Further, the applicability of Sexton to situations involving home rule author-
ity that conflicts with subsequtently-enacted state legislation will be deter-
mined by the particular state legislation. 86
80. Carlson v. Briceland, 61 Ill. App. 3d 247, 252-53, 377 N.E.2d 1138, 1142-43 (1st Dist.
1978).
81. Id.
82. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a).
83. Justice Ryan in his concurring opinion emphasized the narrow construction that must be
given to the Sexton decision: "This case involves onlv the question of the authority of a home
rule unit to regulate the location of landfills through the use of zoning power. There is no need
to discuss . . . what authority a non home role unit has in this area." 75 Ill. 2d at 520, 389
N.E.2d at 562. (Ryan, J., concurring).
84. The court distinguished between home rule and non home rule units throughout its decision,
emphasizing that a different approach is needed when a non home rule unit is involved. 75 Ill. 2d at
513, 389 N.E.2d at 559.
85. "Few ordinances will have absolutely no impact beyond the borders of the home rule
unit .... [T]he validity of home rule regulation under section 6 (a) should be determined by
comparing the effect of the ordinance in the governmental unit with its extraterritorial effect."
Michael & Norton, Home Rule in Illinois: A Functional Analysis, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 559, 574
[hereinafter cited as Michael and Norton]. See text accompanying notes 72-75 supra.
86. See text accompanying notes 76-77 supra.
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CONCLUSION
Although Sexton must be narrowly construed, the overriding judicial con-
cern in Sexton to ensure the home rule unit some voice in environmental
regulation within its boundaries has been achieved. 87 Sexton has estab-
lished precedent that regulation of the sites of sanitary landfills pertains to a
county's government and affairs and thus is included within its home rule
powers. Sexton also has established the principle that a home rule unit may
legislate concurrently with the General Assembly on matters of environmen-
tal control. 88 Concurrent jurisdiction by the home rule unit and the IEPA is
essential to protect the competing interests involved in the regulation of
sanitary landfills. 89
The court has clarified the applicability of prior court decisions in this
area and thus has reduced the need for future judicial involvement. Any
limitation on a home rule unit's power must therefore come from the legisla-
ture. Sexton is an indication that the Illinois Supreme Court has overcome its
reluctance to construe the powers of a home rule unit broadly in accordance
with the spirit of the Illinois Constitution. The framers of the state constitu-
tion similarly intended to place the responsibility for limiting this power
where it rightfully belongs, with the legislature.
Gail Buoscio Rago
87. See note 83 and accompanying text supra.
Perhaps the most extreme result of State preemption of the home rule power has been fore-
cast by P. Orlinsky, Is the Future of Local Zoning Doomed?: O'Connor, Carlson, and Beyond,
66 ILL. B.J. 262 (1978): "It may very well be that all that is necessary to remove any facility
from the purview of a local zoning ordinance is the acquisition of a permit from the Environ-
mental Protection Agency." Id. at 286.
88. 75 II. 2d at 512-13, 389 N.E.2d at 559. See Michael and Norton, supra note 84, at 574.
As the authors have noted, "recognizing exclusive IEPA authority would lead to the ironical result
that home rule units today would possess less power to control the location of disposal sites than
local governments possessed prior to the adoption of home rule."
89. As a means of protecting the competing interests involved, a balancing test that would
have utility beyond IEPA situations has been suggested. "Such an approach would weigh the
extent to which the local government's exercise of power would impinge upon the interests of
other governmental entities or of persons beyond the borders of the home rule unit." Michael
& Norton, supra note 84, at 574. See also Carlson v. Briceland, 61 Ill. App. 3d 247, 377
N.E.2d 1138 (1st Dist. 1978). This approach is similar to Professor Baum's argument that is
quoted extensively by Justice Underwood in his concurring opinion in Sexton, 75 II1. 2d at
517-19, 389 N.E.2d at 561-62 (Underwood, J., concurring).
1980]

